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Abstract 
In this paper we propose and apply three models on statistical data of some Romanian farms, to verify the action of 
the Miller-Modigliani theorems: Mahagaonkar- Qiu procedures that test the effects of the capital structure on the 
market value of the firm and the effects of the financial leverage on the weighted average cost of capital; another 
econometric model which tests contemporaneous and delayed effects of total debts on the market value of the firm. 
In order to apply Mahagaonkar- Qiu methodologies and, because of the fact that in Romanian farms there is a high heterogeneity 
from the point of view of the physical capital endowment and of the exploitation surfaces, we have to perform clustering analyses 
using artificial neural networks of Self-Organizing Maps type, based on five financial indicators of the firm. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 50s, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller were the first to systematically study the relationship between 
the value of the firm and its financial structure. Their theorem which appeared in 1958 is the corner stone of modern 
corporate finance. They assert that on a frictionless perfectly competitive market, it is irrelevant whether a firm 
finances the investments by issuance of shares or loan (issuance of bonds).  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) prove there are insignificant connections between the financial leverage and the 
capital cost and in 1966 they prove that there is no evidence on the effects of leverage or dividend policy on the 
convex capital cost function. In fact, there are several situations when financial decisions influence the firm value. 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) tried to prove their theorem on energy industry datasets and they hardly found 
correspondences between the leverage and the capital cost. Davenport (1971) makes an empirical experiment on the 
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United Kingdom dataset, using three groups of industries: chemical industry, food industry and metal working 
industry. He finds out that the capital cost is independent of its structure.  
Of course there is evidence against MM theorem. Weston (1963), Masulis (1980), Pinegar and Lease (1986), Lee 
(1987) show that the capital increases with the financial lever value. Miller (1988) states that he has hoped to solve 
the empirical problems, but he did not achieve much. In spite of some attempts to empirically prove MM theorem, 
Myers (2001) asserts that this is difficult to test on empirical data.  
The financial lever (the ratio debt/stock or equity capital) may have positive or negative effects on the return of 
stocks, depending on the relation between the interest rate and the profitability rate of the firm (Travaglini 2002). 
Travaglini (2002) analyses the conditions in which the hypothesis on the irrelevance of the firm’s financial structure 
on its value holds. Mahagaonkar and Qiu (2009) and Levati et al. (2012) make attempts to experimentally test MM 
theorem by means of general equilibrium theory. They aim to answer the question whether or not the capital 
structure influences the firm value. DeAngelo and Stulz (2013) enrich the MM model by including financially 
constrained parties and households which use liquid financial claims to have unrestricted access to capital. They 
prove that high leverage is optimal for banks when the households are willing to pay a premium to have immediate 
access to capital. Gersbach et al. (2013) prove that a macroeconomic version of MM 1 theorem holds if we impose 
minimum equity capital requirements. Adrian and Shin (2010) discuss the reasons for the procyclicality of the 
leverage, i.e. during booms the leverage is high and during crises it is low. They empirically prove in (Adrian and 
Shin 2013) that the intermediary leverage is negatively connected to the banks’ value at risk. They also prove 
theoretically that in a contracting framework the leverage is procyclical.  
We mention some applications of MM theorem. For a dataset of the USA Electric Utilities and Oil Companies, 
Mondher (2011) shows that the relation between leverage and firm value is influenced by the firm’s payout ratio. 
Lee and Tu (2011) use MCDM techniques such as DEMATEL, ANP and VIKOR in order to make a hierarchy of 
the value of South Asian companies by means of MM theorem.  
The main two MM theorems are: 
MM Theorem 1: a. The market value of the firm is independent of its capital structure (the ratio Debt/Shares).  
b. Since the interests are not taxed, if there is a tax on the revenue of the corporation with the taxation rate W, the 
levered firm has a greater total revenue with WB the value of the fiscal benefit, where B is the value of debt. 
MM Theorem 2: a. The dividend policy of the firm has no effect on consumption. 
b. The market value of the firm is independent of its dividend policy.  
     The conclusion of several researchers of this theory is that these theorems are consequences of the no-arbitrage 
principle: if any investor may realize the same financial transactions as the firm does and at the same price, then the 
investor can annul the effects of financial policy of the firm, without having losses or risks.  
      Our objective is to empirically prove the validity of the MM1 and MM2 theorems by means of three models.  
The first two models are adaptations for small and medium-sized agricultural companies of Qiu and Mahagaonkar 
(2008) work and the third model approximates the delayed effect of the debts on the market value of the firm. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 is the introduction; Section 2 contains the models used to prove the 
action of the MM theorems; Section 3 debates clustering methods, Section 4 tackles an empirical approach and data 
analysis; Section 5 comprises results, main conclusions and topics for further research. 
2. Models for proving the MM theorems action 
In this section, we experiment three methodologies, two belonging to Qiu -Mahagaonkar (2008) and the other 
being proposed by Andrei et al. (2013). Qiu -Mahagaonkar methodology highlights the effects of capital 
structure on the value of the firm. The influence of the capital structure on the market value of the firm can be 
analyzed in two ways: the MM theorem and the U shape cost of capital. The Modigliani-Miller theorem states 
that the value of the firm is independent of the capital structure; whereas the U shape cost of capital implies that 
the cost of capital first decreases with the value of bonds (the credit value), and then increases after the ratio of 
bonds exceeds some threshold.  
     In order to prove one of the above theories, they use the linear mixed-effects regressions: 
 iiiii tBBuV HEEEQ  3
2
21                                                                              (1) 
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with 3,2,1 i  independent groups set up depending on the ratio debt / market value of the firm. 
     In accordance with the MM theorem, the increase of leverage increases the systematic risk of equity. The 
explanatory variables are the intercept (Q ), the value of bonds (B), the square of the value of bonds ( 2B ), and 
period (t), which are designed to highlight the relationship between the debt and the market value of the firm. The 
variable )N(0,~ 2uViu  denotes the random effects on the intercept for each group and the group’s error 
)N(0,~ 2HVH i . 
     If the coefficients 1E  and 2E  are significant, their signs reveal that the MM hypothesis is proved for the 
experiment or the U shape cost of capital hypothesis is proved.  
     The second experiment is the linear mixed-effects regression of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), 
calculated as the expected return  divided by the market value of the firm, and the independent variables are 
financial leverage W  measured as the ratio of market value of debt to the market value of the firm, 2W  and period 
(t):  
iiiii tuWACC HEWEWEN  3
2
21                                                                                      (2) 
with 3,2,1 i , independent groups, )N(0,~ 2uViu and  the group’s error )N(0,~
2
HVH i . 
    For the last methodology we started with the expression of the market value of the firm, as a function of the  
two preceding years’ debts, the current debt and of the time: 
ititititi tBBBV HEEEEQ   423121                                                                            (3) 
where tiV  is the market value of the firm i in the period t, tiB  is the value of the debts of the i-th firm in the 
period t,  Q  is the intercept, and iH  is the white noise error. 
    We assume that, if the firm satisfies the requirements of the MM1 theorem, then the parameters 321 ,, EEE
will have small, but positive, values, thanks for the tax benefit, and the coefficient 4E  will also have a positive 
value, which means that the increase in the market value of the firm is ensured mainly by other factors, 
independent of the value of the loan. 
3.  Clustering method 
In order to apply the two methodologies of Qiu –Mahagaonkar, we first applied SOM (Self-Organizing Maps) 
clustering technique for the 25 farms series of data.  
SOM is one of the most frequent techniques for data visualization and clustering. It was initiated by (Kohonen, 
2001a, 2001b) as an unsupervised type of neural network to create a two-dimensional representation of the input 
data. SOM network consists of an input layer and an output layer.  The input data is mapped on a rectangular or 
hexagonal grid which is the output layer. The network is divided into nodes or neurons; the number of neurons can 
vary.  The neurons are grouped in clusters based on the distance between nodes. The most common distance 
measure between the neurons is the Euclidian distance.  
      SOM is based on BATCH algorithm (Vesanto et al., 2000), that we briefly present.  
The training of the map processes all data simultaneously (Sarlin , 2011; Sarlin et al., 2011). A reference vector jm
of the same dimension as the input data is associated with each node j.  
     The algorithm has two steps: in the first step, each input data vector ix  is associated with  jm  
jijci
mxmx   min  
     The new reference vector im is adjusted as: 
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where n is the number of  input vectors, }{minarg kjk mxc  is the index of the best matching neuron of data 
sample jx , )(thic is the neighbourhood function value at its best matching neuron. 
4. Results and main conclusions 
    The empirical work has begun with the clustering application, using SOM (Self-Organizing Maps) clustering 
technique. The high heterogeneity of the agricultural farms has induced the selection of a pertinent indicator for the 
clustering process on the whole horizon. We took into account two indicators, the expected value and the median, 
respectively, for the five variables included in the model. We estimated Huber’s location indicator and we remarked 
that for most of the variables, the median firm is the most adequate for the clustering process. 
   In Table 1,  we present the median and Huber indicator for each firm of the sample, for Market Value variable 
 
 
Table  1  Location indicators for  Market  value 
Market value F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Median 9264173,90 4258249,30 1788015,40 7810037,00 14759174,15 21864412,25 9130742,55 
Huber's M-estimators 9323327,18 4293726,64 1749004,73 7893448,24 14150706,02 21851930,28 9140158,07 
 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 
Median 7738243,60 10358637,80 1362433,45 1612773,10 2812170,85 2233870,30 15048060,60 
Huber's M-estimators 7661257,68 10348229,55 1356134,84 1546468,94 2760816,65 2227951,41 16584232,01 
 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 F20 F21 
Median 23771819,85 5914007,00 23450527,65 17193310,30 21014064,00 20623729,80 10278728,35 
Huber's M-estimators 24511044,35 5974297,94 23919357,58 17901199,86 21010416,32 20308860,21 10704862,01 
 F22 F23 F24 F25    
Median 7894254,45 7866784,40 1429615,60 10367583,00    
Huber's M-estimators 7878338,58 7953686,10 1379883,47 10356527,80    
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Table 3  Estimations of market value as a function of  debt  
Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Intercept 1.33*107 -1.04*107 -2.49*106 7.54*106 1.38*107 1.97*107 9.55*106 
Value of bond (B) -4.97 46.97 27.23 0.84 -0.71 0.0048 -0.2 
Square value of  bond (B2) 1.37*10-6 -3.73*10-5 -4.18*10-5 -3.07*10-7 2.67*10-7 2.65*10-9 -3.84*10-8 
Variable F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 
Intercept 1.04*107 1.5*107 1.2*107 -3.93*105 -5.52*106 5.47*105 -2.15*108 
Value of bond (B) -3.19 -4.43 -53.76 2.11 35.53 0.86 122 
Square value of  bond (B2) 8.46*10-7 9.79*10-7 6.63*10-5 -5.12*10-7 -3.76*10-5 -1.07*10-7 -1.58*10-5 
Variable F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 F20 F21 
Intercept 9.9*107 6.89*106 1.17*108 1.19*108 6.68*107 5.25*107 -2.94*107 
Value of bond (B) -24.66 -1.77 -43.69 -5.8*102 -18.94 -13.03 35.22 
Square value of  bond (B2) 2.03*10-6 6.52*10-7 5.02*10-6 8.11*10-5 1.86*10-6 1.27*10-6 -7.18*10-6 
Variable F22 F23 F24 F25    
Intercept 7.15*106 6.68*106 3.57*106 1.1*107    
Value of bond (B) 1.68 2.09 -1.98 -0.8    
Square value of  bond (B2) -7.61*10-7 -7.23*10-7 4.23*10-7 1.99*10-7    
 
Regressing the weighted average capital cost (WACC) on the financial leverage, according to the second Qiu –
Mahagaonkar model, one obtains similar results with the ones obtained in the previous model, specifying that 
statistically speaking, the goodness of fit is much better. These results are based on Table 4.  
 
Table  4   Estimations of WACC  as a function on leverage 
Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Intercept 0.01 9.99*10-3 -0.15 0.05 0.01 0.01 1.45*10-3 
Leverage (Ĳ) 0.09 0.08 2.45 - 0.02 0.35 0.004 0.27 
Square value of  
leverage(Ĳ2) 
-0.23 0.02 - 4.35 0.07 -0.27 1.99*10-5 -0.82 
Variable F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 
Intercept 1.77*10-3 -1.18*10-3 0.14 0.7*10-2 0.03 0.33 2.55*10-3 
Leverage (Ĳ) 0.27 0.04 -0.28 0.04 1.37 -0.27 0.17 
Square value of  
leverage(Ĳ2) 
-0.57 -0.08 0.74 -6.3*10-3 -1.57 0.12 -0.07 
Variable F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 F20 F21 
Intercept 0.61*10-2 0.09 0.01 8.24*10-3 8.06*10-3 4.69*10-3 7.88*10-3 
Leverage (Ĳ) -0.01 0.27 -6.04*10-3 0.95 0.04 0.06 0.01 
Square value of  
leverage(Ĳ2) 
0.06 -0.63 0.22 3.45*10-2 0.1 -3.87*10-3 0.07 
Variable F22 F23 F24 F25    
Intercept 0.02 0.04 0.2 0.03    
Leverage (Ĳ) 0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.16    
Square value of  
leverage(Ĳ2) 
-0.24 0.15 0.03 0.52    
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Using the panel data analysis (Table 5), we estimated the three models, models 1-st and 2-nd of Qiu –
Mahagaonkar and AR(2), respectively. We notice that the first two models reflect a U-shaped capital cost, with a 
very flattened bump, while the autoregressive approach denotes that the market value is influenced, to a very small 
percentage, only by current debts, which, in that manner could prove MM1 Theorem.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results presented above suggest that the effect of capital structure on the cost of capital is not entirely clear 
and, probably due to the market imperfections, it is uncertain whether or not, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, 
which leads to the use of other techniques in future studies.  
A possible direction would be to estimate the above models using the membership of the firms to clusters as a 
grouping variable within panel data analysis.   
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